ECFA advice for mainland China
China Times | Jan. 30, 2010
ECFA advice for mainland China
The first round of formal negotiations on an economic cooperation framework agreement between Taiwan and mainland China was held recently in Beijing. After the preliminary formalities, a few basic points of agreement were reached. Experts predict that negotiations can be completed before the end of May, at which point the agreement can be signed.
In Taiwan, the Ma Ying-jeou administration has already set a schedule for when the Executive Yuan should provide reports and updates to the Legislative Yuan. And since the ruling Kuomintang has a solid majority in the Legislature, approval of the agreement should not be a problem. In Beijing, the May signing schedule should be even less of a problem: once the central government in Beijing sets the agenda, everything else follows smoothly.
In what follows, two crucial points regarding ECFA are discussed, and a few words of advice are given to the authorities in Beijing.
When it comes to the contents of ECFA, there is not much disagreement, as the two sides are in basic agreement over such things as an early harvest list, opening up of service industries and dispute resolution.
Sources indicate that the widest divisions are in relation to whether Taiwan should allow 830 mainland agricultural products into the island. Taiwan already allows other nations to import many of these products, but it places restrictions on these goods when they originate from mainland China. In effect, Taiwan is proposing a special set of rules for the mainland; and, strictly speaking, this is contrary to the spirit of the World Trade Organization which calls for a multilateral reduction of tariffs.
Since the two sides are seeking an economic cooperation even closer than that called for by WTO rules, the mainland naturally wishes that the restrictions on these products be lifted. Simply put, China’s request is for “normalization”: when it comes to these 830 agricultural products, the mainland does not want to be singled out by Taiwan.
From a logical point of view, normalization of trade should be a prerequisite to the formation of any free trade zone or economic cooperation agreement. But Taiwan’s situation is unique after all, and Beijing should not evaluate things using a “normal” set of rules.
Much of Taiwan’s agricultural sector is concentrated in the south, and the south is the mainstay of the “green” camp—those who are most strongly in favor of Taiwanese independence. Thus these agricultural goods are entangled with an extremely sensitive issue in Taiwan, the confrontation between the “greens” and the “blues”—those who are more in favor of unification with mainland China.
If the situation is mishandled even slightly, those parts of the Taiwanese media most strongly in favor of the green point of view could seize on the issue. An enormous political storm could ensue, which would make the internal divisions within the island more serious than ever before.
The Beijing establishment should ask itself: If the U.S. beef controversy was able to cause such a huge ruckus in Taiwan, how much more horrendous would the situation be, if hundreds of mainland agricultural goods were allowed entry?
Taiwan is a democratic society after all, with many different points of view. The mainland authorities must try to understand Taiwan’s situation more deeply, and not underestimate the gravity of the situation.
The second point to make also has to do with the feelings of the people, and is even more sensitive than the issue of agricultural products. It involves the question, to what extent will Taiwan be allowed to enter free trade agreements with other nations, once an ECFA has been signed?
As is well known, when the mainland entered a free trade agreement with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Hong Kong was excluded from the deal. Hong Kong could only sign a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement with the mainland, because it is considered a part of the Chinese government.
After Taiwan signs an ECFA with the mainland, the people will observe closely if Taiwan is allowed to sign FTAs with other nations. If not, this will be read as a sign that Taiwan has been “Hong Kong-ized.” If an ECFA is signed in May, and Taiwan is unable to sign a single FTA with another nation before the 2012 presidential elections, it would confirm all the suspicions held by the people, that Taiwan has become another Hong Kong.
What would be even worse is if the people interpret the statement that “Taiwan can only sign an ECFA with the mainland” to mean that Taiwan has already been reduced to the status of another Hong Kong. With this interpretation in mind, the people could then come to believe that signing an ECFA is only a prelude to “one country, two systems.”
Then the situation will be very difficult to handle indeed. Opinion polls over the last few years have consistently indicated that between 70 percent and 80 percent of the people of Taiwan find “one country, two systems” unacceptable. Such a clear statement of popular will shows a deep mistrust among a majority of the people, and this mistrust is strong enough to overturn all efforts toward cross-strait peace.
Once this suspicion deepens, not only will it become extremely difficult for the blues to remain in power, it could also result in a dangerous and precipitous deterioration in cross-strait relations. In this regard, too, the mainland must clearly read the view of the people, lest its misunderstanding cause it to make the wrong choice.
What is encouraging is that so far the leaders of both sides have refrained from making any definitive statements on the matter. They have, in other words, left themselves a great deal of room to maneuver.
On the Taiwan side, its government has the right to decide things for itself, and has no need to announce its next moves in advance in order to please or provoke anyone. As to the mainland, its leader Hu Jintao has been conciliatory in his “six points on cross-strait relations.” Similarly, Wang Yi, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the mainland’s State Council, said recently that the mainland was not opposed to Taiwan entering into FTAs with other nations, though these remarks were later retracted.
On the whole, then, statements from mainland officials have been ambiguous, if also moderate. This type of approach—of “not provoking Taiwan and not forcing it into a corner”—is positive, insofar as it can help ease tensions. But sooner or later the mainland has to show its cards.
Only if the two sides understand their respective societies and the will of their respective peoples can the correct decisions be made. Only then will the two sides be able to deepen their cooperation and create a win-win situation.
Peaceful development across the straits is a slow, gradual process. The authorities in Beijing need to understand Taiwan more deeply and must wait more patiently.
